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Feminism and the Politics of Representation: Towards a Critical and Ethical 





This essay begins from the position that a speaking subject in feminism occupies 
a place of power and authority which requires a commitment to an ethical involvement in 
the representation of ‘others’. Specifically, this essay will address feminist concerns of 
speaking for others and the concerns raised by the dangers of representing across 
differences of race, sexuality, gender and cultures. First, it will critique feminist claims to 
political effectivity as a solution to ethical representation. Second, it will look at how 
hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological positions are inconsistently 
represented in feminist discussions. Lastly, it will briefly examine how differences 
between ‘others’ are increasingly being represented as cultural in potentially problematic 
ways. The essay will argue that feminist discussions of representation must be self-
critical, but at the same time not abandon the task of working towards an ethical 
involvement with ‘others’.  
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 Feminist researchers and theorists are implicated in both the process of speaking 
for and representing others. These practices of representation are directly tied to the 
production of knowledge and power and are thus ethical and political. Given this, the 
politics of representation pose particularly troublesome issues for feminist theorists. 
Indeed, the feminist project of transforming power relations and improving the material 
conditions of people’s lives is complicated by the contradictory and difficult problems of 
representing the subjectivities and identities of ‘others’. In light of this concern, this essay 
examines how representational practices are tied to epistemological debates about 
working toward an ethical involvement with ‘others’. 
 The parameters of concern within this essay are marked by my engagement with 
feminist epistemology during my Master’s degree. As a student of feminist theory, I have 
sought to critically interrogate how practices of representation, which feminist 
epistemology has so effectively criticized and theorized, are often recuperated as the 
ground to feminist claims of political efficacy. As such, this paper will seek to make 
theoretical connections between three areas of feminist concern. First, it will critique the 
notion that feminist claims to political effectivity provide a solution to questions of 
ethical representation. Second, it will explore how feminist epistemologies reproduce 
hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological positions that problematically rely on 
binaries such as ‘western/non-western’. Third, it will examine how within feminist 
epistemology, differences between ‘others’ are being represented as culturally 
incommensurable in potentially problematic ways. By working through these three areas, 
the essay will argue that a full ethical engagement with ‘others’ is a misguided approach, 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally written for a course on gender, epistemology and research methodology in 
2004/05 during Amy Hinterberger’s MSc in Gender at the London School of Economics (LSE), Gender 
Institute. Since 2006, she has begun a PhD in the Department of Sociology at the LSE. 
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which needs to be displaced by a politics of representation that stresses the impossibility 
of ever fully knowing ‘others’. As such, the essay will contend that feminist discussions 
of representation must be continuously self-critical, but at the same time not abandon the 
task of working towards an ethical involvement with ‘others’. 
 The recognition that there is a problem with speaking for, or representing others, 
stems from two connected points. First, that a speaker’s location is epistemologically 
significant and second, that certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous 
(Alcoff, 1995: 100). According to Alcoff, both speaking about and speaking for others is 
problematic, namely because these both engage in the act of representing others (Alcoff, 
1995: 101). As such, any feminist theory which involves either ‘subject construction’ (or 
‘object formation’) involves representation and therefore cannot be separated from power 
inequalities. The terms ‘subject construction’ and ‘object formation’ are used by Spivak 
(1988: 306). Both terms are crucial to discussions of representation because while some 
feminist theory has critiqued traditional knowledge models as being of objects (Code, 
1993: 39), engaging in the construction of subjectivities of ‘others’ for the purposes of 
making knowledge claims is also problematic. Indeed, this is what Alcoff refers to as the 
“crisis of representation” (Alcoff, 1995:100). 
 Yet, feminist debates on representation, which are productive of representation 
themselves, reveal that the meanings and practices tied to this realm are not agreed upon 
or transparent. In some cases, feminist representational practices and debates tend to 
disguise the messy and complicated aspects of representation. For example, Spivak 
(1999) identifies two different types of representation. These are darstellen (to represent 
in the aesthetic sense) and vertreten (to represent or to speak for politically) (Spivak, 
1999: 256). Spivak argues that there is a tendency in feminist identity politics to conflate 
these two types of representation in order to move “beyond representation” and its 
problematic aspects (Spivak, 1999: 257). Spivak’s distinction between different types of 
representation, along with her insistence that these different modes of representation not 
be conflated requires specific attention from feminist theorists concerned about 
representing others. Indeed, Spivak’s charge requires feminist theorists to question how 
their work is implicated in power relations and in the production of knowledge about 
‘others’. In this respect, it is crucial that feminist theorists question how their work is 
productive of representing ‘others’. 
 Feminist projects are dedicated to shifting, changing or revealing dominant 
understandings in order to challenge power relations and improve the material conditions 
for the lives of groups and individuals. However, as Alcoff argues, within these projects 
practices of representation carry high stakes. It is in this vein that Alcoff argues that 
“ultimately, the question of speaking for others bears crucially on the possibility of 
political effectivity” (Alcoff, 1995: 102). According to Alcoff (1995: 116), political 
effectivity should enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples. Alcoff’s argument 
however, makes some rather hasty jumps from articulating the problems of speaking for 
others to assuming that it might be ethical to speak for others so long as it is empowering. 
This presupposes that one might have unmediated knowledge of who ‘oppressed people’ 
are and what is in their interests. I would argue that Alcoff’s argument runs the risk of 
easily slipping into convenient categories of identity (such as the ‘Third World woman’), 
where an ‘obviousness’ of oppression is simply assumed. Feminists however, cannot 
transparently know who ‘oppressed people’ are and what will aid them simply because 
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they are concerned with the politics of empowerment. Although Alcoff describes how 
privileged locations bear epistemic and discursive importance in representation, she does 
not indicate how one could ethically make knowledge claims about what is best for 
others, or for that matter even know what is in the interests of ‘the oppressed’. Alcoff’s 
claim to political effectivity has overriding epistemological and normative assumptions 
that are not fleshed out, thus undermining her discussion on ethical feminist strategies of 
representation. 
 A strategy of representational ethics cannot be sustained on a vague notion of 
political effectivity, which seeks to empower ‘oppressed people’. If “source [for example 
the location of the author] is only relevant to the extent that is has an impact on effect” 
(Alcoff, 1995: 115), then political effectivity appears to be a shallow strategy for the 
legitimate concerns raised by Alcoff in the first place. In asserting that source is only 
relevant to effect, Alcoff might be arguing that using ‘the masters tools’ is an employable 
strategy for destroying the ‘masters house’ (Lorde, 1984).2 And while this might be the 
case, an appeal to political effectivity still leaves unanswered just who decides what 
effects are desirable and empowering for others (or for themselves). As Ahmed (1998) 
argues, one must not lose sight of who is defining desirable effects for whom in feminist 
politics. She states, “to argue against the self-evident nature of the category of 
emancipatory values…is to argue that ‘we’ need to make decisions about what values are 
more emancipatory than others, as well as what may constitute ‘emancipation’” (Ahmed, 
1998: 55). In this sense, representations of ‘others’ within feminist theory are implicitly 
linked to normative assumptions about what effects are desirable. It is therefore crucial 
that feminist strategies of representation concern themselves with how assumptions of 
oppression and empowerment play out in their representations of ‘others’. Although these 
representational practices might be designed to liberate the worry is that they reproduce 
the problems they seek to escape.  
 The slippage in Alcoff’s argument between problems of representation and 
assumed self-evident knowledge of empowerment or oppression highlights Spivak’s 
concern as to how intellectuals construct the wills of ‘oppressed people’ with transparent 
ease (Spivak, 1999: 265). I am not arguing that Alcoff herself does this, but rather that 
advocating political effectivity to empower oppressed groups needs to be put under the 
same scrutiny as her concerns for representation because they are inevitably linked. 
Spivak powerfully exposes the problematic ways oppressed groups are constructed by 
“benevolent” academics in posing her question “can the subaltern speak?” (Spivak, 1988: 
271 and 1999: 269). She points to the paradoxical ways intellectuals claim to both 
deconstruct the subject and to know and speak for ‘others’. In discussing and speaking 
about ‘others’ (specifically the ‘subaltern woman’), Spivak argues that intellectuals place 
themselves all too easily as transparent communicators of the voices of oppressed 
peoples. Spivak argues that “between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-construction 
and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, 
but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the ‘third world woman’ 
caught between tradition and modernization, culturalism and development”3 (Spivak, 
                                                 
2 For example, Alcoff refers to Spivak’s point that just because the telephone was invented by a European 
upper-class male that this does not prevent it from being used as a tool for resistance (Alcoff, 1995: 115).  
3 The original sentence in Spivak’s 1988 essay does not include “culturalism and development”; it is an 
update for the 1999 revised essay. This addition points to the ways new discourses of the ‘3rd world 
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1999: 304). Thus, the subaltern cannot speak. The representational practices of the 
intellectual which serve to centralize the ‘western’ subject depend upon an unavoidable 
muting of the subaltern’s intent. As a result, Spivak argues that theorists must be attentive 
to their own work and how it is implicated in processes of representation.  
 The intellectual rendering of the subaltern as silent is not only the work of western 
male theorists; it is also a problem for post-colonial, feminist and transnational theorists. 
Thus Spivak warns “let us also suspend the mood of self-congratulation as saviors of 
marginality” (Spivak, 1992: 204). Feminist representational practices must therefore not 
assume to know, or have unmediated access to knowledge of ‘others’. Indeed, for Spivak, 
due to the structure of representation, full or complete knowledge of ‘others’ is an 
impossibility (Spivak, 1999: 283). Thus, ethical strategies of representing ‘others’ need to 
be based on working responsibly within this framework of impossibility, not trying to 
sidestep it. 
 Claims to political effectivity fail to provide a solution to the dilemmas of ethical 
representation. However, dilemmas of ethical representation are also linked to how 
feminist epistemologies reproduce hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological 
positions that problematically rely on binaries such as ‘western/non-western’. In this 
sense, feminist epistemologies are implicated in legitimizing who can (and who cannot) 
employ representational practices for resistance purposes. And as my argument will 
demonstrate in the following paragraphs, feminist critiques of representation tend to fall 
suspiciously along divisions of ‘western-white’ and ‘non-western-non-white’, potentially 
reproducing these divisions. 
 In her critique of how “the politics of location” (Rich, 1986) has been taken up by 
various feminists, Kaplan (1997) argues that feminists need to be responsible in 
representing and investigating other cultures, so as to avoid the mystification and 
naturalization of ‘others’. According to Kaplan, the “politics of location” get taken up as 
the superficial celebration of difference and pluralism, or what she calls the “poetics of 
relativism” (Kaplan, 1997: 144). In this respect, what appears to be a commitment to 
global feminism easily turns out to be an act of Western imperialism. As an example, 
Kaplan takes issue with Elizabeth Meese and her analysis of Rigoberta Menchu’s 
testimonio4 in her effort to transcend differences between women, as well as gaps 
between theory and practice (Kaplan: 1997, 147). Kaplan asserts that Meese appropriates 
Menchu’s text granting ‘theory’ status to ‘activist’ intent and that this “might matter only 
to those who have the social power to discriminate between critical and cultural 
practices” (Kaplan, 1997: 147). In making this argument, Kaplan is highlighting the 
                                                                                                                                                 
woman’, render the subaltern silent. Humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations have created 
new discourses such as reproductive health programs and micro-finance in developing nations. Parpart’s 
essay on the rise of the “development expert” fleshes out the consequences of these discourses for theory 
and practice (Parpart, 1995). Similarly, discourses of culturalism are increasingly prevalent in liberal 
multicultural theory, which pits women’s equality in liberal states in opposition to the preservation of ‘3rd 
world cultures’. Within these liberal discourses Spivak’s phrase “white men are saving brown women from 
brown men” (Spivak, 1988: 297) takes on a disturbing new reality. For liberal positions see: Okin 1999, 
Coleman 1996. For critiques see: Phillips 2003, Narayan 2000 and 2002.    
4 Kaplan is referring to Meese’s analyses of the 1983 book I, Rigoberta Menchu which recounts the life 
story of Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian women through the genre of the testimonial. Published as oral or 
written autobiographical narratives (for example Menchu’s life is recounted to Elizabeth Burgos-Debray) 
the testimonial genre works with hybrid authorial strategies often bringing to light accounts of social 
oppression, war and violence.  
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power dynamics at work in how particular acts or texts of resistance come to be 
important, and for who they come to be important to.  
While Kaplan is correct to highlight this process, her selective critique of Meese 
becomes problematic when it is compared to other feminist strategies of representation 
and knowledge production. In her critique, Kaplan argues that the “politics of location” 
can either encourage resistance to hegemonic formations or become an instrument of 
hegemony depending upon “who utilizes the concept in what particular context” (Kaplan, 
1997: 138). Yet, using lived experience as a basis for knowledge production and 
representation is central to various feminist theorists that claim to challenge dominant or 
‘Western’ forms of knowledge. For example, Hill Collins argues that central to a black 
feminist epistemology are the lived experiences of black women (Hill Collins, 2000: 
257). As such, Hill Collins presents us with a project of using black women’s lived 
experiences and turning them into theory, namely a black feminist epistemology. I would 
argue however, that it is unlikely that Kaplan would level the same critique of Meese 
against Hill Collins even though they engage in a similar practice of using lived 
experience or ‘everyday knowledge’ as a basis for epistemology. Thus, Kaplan’s 
arguments are implicated in legitimizing who can (and who cannot) use ‘the politics of 
location’ for resistance purposes and her selective critiques fall suspiciously along 
divisions of western/white and non-western/non-white, potentially reproducing these 
divisions. 
 In this respect, Kaplan’s critique of how the ‘politics of location’ have been taken 
up in feminist representational practices might itself be representative of an 
epistemological double-standard, whereby the ‘non-Western’ racially female voice 
becomes a “metaphor for the good” which unquestionably resists ‘Western’ hegemony 
(Suleri, 1992: 337). Suleri’s argument that racially-encoded feminism has taken on an 
“embarrassing privilege” (Suleri, 1992: 335) bears on the gaps between Meese and Hill 
Collins. It bears even more so however, on the implicit hierarchies of oppression and 
privileged ontological positions that play out in feminist representational practices. 
 Taking a somewhat blasphemous position within feminist theory, Suleri argues 
that she wants to dismantle racially-encoded feminism’s (namely, post-colonial feminist 
theory) iconic status (Suleri, 1992: 335). In this sense, Suleri’s critique of feminism as 
‘skin deep’ (Suleri, 1992: 335) points to how representational practices in feminism 
might to easily turn on conventional categories of identity which read ‘location’ off the 
bodies of ‘others’ in problematic ways. Feminist theorists must therefore be attentive to 
the ways their discussions of representation might reproduce the unequal power relations 
and disparate speaking positions they seek to question and challenge.  
 A similar evaluation of feminist theory is offered by Bar On, who critiques the 
notion of “epistemic privilege” (Bar On, 1993: 83). Bar On argues that the idea of 
epistemic privilege (that some perspectives are more revealing than others) is ultimately 
based upon giving “authority” to certain viewpoints, which ends up being a tool designed 
to “silence and command obedience from the authorized voice” (Bar On, 1993: 96). From 
this perspective, the authorizing of particular kinds of representational practices (such as 
Kaplan’s) might be seen as antithetical to feminism because authorization is exclusionary 
practice. However, this is not to argue that feminist theorists should not engage in any 
authorization of knowledge. Rather, it is the process of allowing or accepting certain 
kinds of authorizations that requires further critical interrogation and analysis.  
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 Haraway also cautions against the notion of ‘epistemic privilege’ by arguing that 
seeking out the “perfect” subject of oppositional history is misguided as “subjugation is 
not grounds for ontology” (Haraway, 1988: 582). Yet, in a similar vein to standpoint 
theorists such as Hartsock (1983), Haraway does argue for an epistemology of location 
and positioning, “where partiality is the condition of making rational knowledge claims” 
(Haraway, 1988: 606). In this respect, Suleri’s argument that “lived experience as an 
alternative mode of radical subjectivity only rehearses the objectification of its proper 
subject” (Suleri, 1992: 339) might be simplifying standpoint theory’s complex 
epistemological positioning. Unfortunately there is not space in this essay to fully do 
justice to the wide-ranging debates on standpoint theory. Yet, it should be noted that 
standpoint theory has powerfully challenged dominant (or positivist) notions of 
objectivity and truth. This essay does not seek to represent standpoint as a simple theory 
that unequivocally believes some people have privileged access to truth, but rather that 
standpoint theory argues that “the process of approximating the truth is part of a 
dialogical relationship among subjects who are differently situated” (Yuval-Davis and 
Stoetzler, 2002: 315). Nevertheless, Suleri’s argument does point to the flawed and 
contradictory ways ‘epistemic privilege’ might be granted to racially-encoded feminism. 
In relation to strategies of representation then, feminist theorists need to be aware of the 
ways their critiques and silences might be authorizing the ‘epistemic privilege’ of some 
groups in inconsistent ways.  
 Given these concerns, strategies of representation must also be mindful of the 
ways ‘differences’ between ‘others’ are invoked and relied upon. This is particularly 
important given the increasing ‘culturalization’ of representational debates that attempt to 
account for differences between and among women. Notions of culture are contested in 
both the theoretical and material sense (Narayan, 2002). Thus, capturing culture is not an 
easy task since it cannot be pinned down. Spivak notes that “culture is alive and always 
on the run, always changeful” (Spivak, 1999: 375). Despite this slipperiness of the 
‘culture’ concept it often invoked and represented as the basis of differences between 
groups and individuals. For example, Schutte argues that “the question of how to 
communicate with “the other” who is culturally different from oneself is one of the 
greatest challenges facing North-South relations and interaction” (Schutte, 2000: 47 
italics added). Schutte argues that there will always be a “residue of meaning” that will 
not be overcome in cross-cultural endeavors and that this produces a level cultural 
incommensurability (Schutte, 2000: 50). 
  I do not want to dispute the claim that there might be levels of 
incommensurability between cultures that feminists need to take into account when 
making normative judgments across cultures.5 Rather, I am wary of how levels of 
incommensurability are consistently represented and taken up as ‘cultural’ when speaking 
and talking about ‘others’. This is troubling because given the fluid and changing nature 
of ‘culture’ it is unclear how cultural differences are to be identified and defined. As 
                                                 
5 For example, Gloria Anzaldua highlights the different meanings produced in English and Spanish cultures 
through the figure of the mestiza. This figure exists on the “borderlands” between cultures and 
understandings of different worlds. (Anzaldua, 1987). Anzaldua’s figure of the mestiza has offered other 
theorists ways to bring together different and disparate societal frameworks. For example, Sandy Stone 
uses the figure of the mestiza to articulate the meanings produced by participants in the virtual communities 
of cyberspace who live both in a virtual and physical world (See: Stone, 2000: 524). 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 8 #2 February 2007 79 
 
 
such, simply relying on notions of incommensurability as necessarily cultural might 
potentially reify a western/non-western binary rooted in the idea of radical cultural 
differences which are left unchallenged and unaccounted for. 
 In representing ‘others’, feminist theorists need to be concerned with how they 
participate in constructions of cultural differences upon which assumptions of 
incommensurability are often built. Spivak asserts that there is a radical un-translatability 
(or incommensurability) of the subaltern voice into dominant discourse and as such 
feminist strategies of representation need to be wary of the unmediated power of assumed 
‘cultural differences’. Given this, an ethics of representation must guard against 
uninterrogated notions of cultural difference, which can too easily become the basis for 
incommensurability. To do otherwise, risks reinforcing “cultural relativism as cultural 
absolutism” where cultural differences can be easily subsumed by the ‘Western’ subject 
(Didur and Heffernan, 2003: 11). As a result of this risk, I would argue that feminist 
strategies of representation need to be self-critical of the selective ways ‘cultural 
differences’ are employed as unquestionably incommensurable. 
 Feminist strategies of representation need to continue to seek out new ways for 
identification and representation of ‘others’. In seeking ethical practices of representation, 
feminists need to keep in place the “(im)possible perspective of the native informant” in 
order to not get caught in some “identity forever” (Spivak, 1999: 352). Yet, this presents 
feminist strategies of representation with a difficult and frustrating mission. As Loomba 
contends, “we are interested in recovering subaltern voices because we are invested in 
changing contemporary power relations” (Loomba: 1998, 243). In this respect, feminist 
theorists have large investments in ‘recovering’ the voices of oppressed groups in order 
to challenge dominant social (and global) structures. Yet, it is often these investments 
that lead feminist theorists to seek out ‘authentic voices’ to represent oppressed groups. 
But as Chow argues “the native is not the non-duped” (Chow, 1994: 140). She asserts, 
“where the colonizer undresses her, the native’s nakedness stares back at him as the 
defiled image of his creation and as the indifferent gaze that says, there was nothing – no 
secret – to be unveiled underneath my clothes. That secret is your fantasm” (Chow, 1994: 
140). If there is nothing beneath the “clothes” of the oppressed then feminist strategies of 
representation must look to invent and imagine dimensions beyond the “deadlock” of 
colonizer/native and western/non-western (Chow, 1994: 141). 
 As such, ethical representational strategies, which seek to account for power and 
authority, might require a commitment to collective struggle supplemented by “the fact 
that a full ethical engagement with the ‘other’ is impossible” (Ahmed, 2002: 568). 
Ahmed argues that a feminist ethics of representation should not be for ‘the other’, but 
rather that “ethics involves responding to the particular other in a present that carries 
traces of the past, as well as opening up the future” (Ahmed, 2002: 572). In challenging 
the notion that feminism should always be future-oriented, Ahmed calls into question 
how feminists might re-imagine their encounters with ‘others’. Similarly, Yuval-Davis 
and Stoetzler also argue that what is central to transformations and transitions in feminist 
epistemologies are various processes of imagining (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002). 
They state “experience, made by the senses and mediated through the faculties of the 
intellect and the imagination, produces knowledge as well as imaginings…here lies 
rooted the possibility and indeterminacy of (or else the ‘freedom’ to) social change” 
(Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002: 320).  
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 The processes of imagining discussed both by Ahmed and Yuval-Davis and 
Stoetzler might counter some of the problematic representational practices within 
feminist epistemology and theory. As Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler suggest, “the emphasis 
on the concept of imagination thus allows for an additional critical perspective on 
epistemology that should be particularly relevant to feminist discussions…” (2002: 324). 
For feminist strategies of representation then, a ‘critical intimacy’6 with the other which 
attempts to re-imagine what the intimacy of encounters might look like is an integral part 
of ethical representation. This is because “creative imagination is crucially involved in 
the construction of the situated subject, the individual and, even more obviously so, the 
collective subject” (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002: 325). The notion of the 
imagination, as well as the process of re-imagining ethical encounters and representations 
of others, might therefore be useful within feminist epistemology to further explore how 
ethical representational strategies might be created and sustained.  
 Indeed, feminist theorists must be attentive to how, through references to 
‘liberation/oppression’, or to ‘western/non-western’, practices of representation end up 
reproducing the very categories that they seek to escape. Similarly, it is crucial that 
theorists are self-critical of how particular arguments are implicated in legitimizing who 
can (and who cannot) employ representations of ‘others’ for resistance purposes. Despite 
these challenges of representation, feminist epistemology, which is already open to 
constant revision, continues to be a central space where dialogues and open critic might 
strengthen ethical approaches to representing ‘others’. Focused on the currents of 
historical and cultural influence, feminist theorists who are committed to theorizing 
contextualized accounts of the everyday, must work towards creating spaces for a 
‘critical intimacy’ with ‘others’. What this continued commitment requires, however, is 
being attentive to feminist theory’s own work and the representational strategies 
employed in efforts to work towards an ethical involvement with ‘others’.  
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